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ABSTRACT

Recently, interest in Web Services has grown throughout the IT community. Especially when it comes to application
integration, the employment of Web Services seems to be a promising approach. But despite the advantages of this
technology, its deployment, particularly in the inter-organizational domain, remains very sparse. As studies show, companies
are reluctant to use it mainly due to security concerns. In this paper we show how to improve the security of Web Services
protecting them against “semantic” attacks by considering entire business processes instead of single method invocations. We
propose a solution consisting of an authorization engine, which makes its decisions about the admissibility of a given call
taking the relations between successive requests into account. Further, we sketch an implementation and explain how a
modeling formalism such as the Business Process Execution Language for Web Services (BPEL4WS) can help to realize it.
Concluding with an analysis of weak points, we pinpoint possible areas of future research activities.
Keywords

Web Services, Security, Business Processes, Authorization.
INTRODUCTION

Web Services are slowly moving beyond the hype and are becoming a serious technology as more and more companies are
announcing their adoption. The problem with Supply Chain Management systems, to take an example for inter-organizational
application integration, is their inherent need for a time consuming and costly integration of the software used by all
participants. Unfortunately, this setback can lead to other problems. Once the integration has been accomplished, the nodes
are coupled in a very tight way, leading to a rigid formation of enterprises rather than a flexible, agile and loosely coupled
network. Especially for small and medium sized enterprises the decision to join in a network of organizations and the costs
associated with it are most likely irreversible and the installed system can therefore thwart the ability to form new
partnerships.
One purpose of service-oriented architectures is to overcome the mentioned problems with monolithic systems. With the help
of the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) companies can expose their functionalities as well as the corresponding
format and semantic aspects. Potential partners of a supply net may rummage Universal Description, Discovery and
Integration (UDDI)-registries in order to find a desired service. Method calls between systems are hereby encoded using the
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) over standard protocols such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), the File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) or the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP).1 Though the concept of Remote Procedure Calls
(RPC) is well known, Web Services present the first common standard that focuses on dynamic business networks (Iyer,
Freedman, Gaynor and Wyner, 2003). Besides RPC messaging, Web Services also support document style messaging
(McCarthy, 2002; Snell, Tidwell and Kulchenko, 2002). When speaking of method invocations in this paper we include both
synchronous and asynchronous messaging style.
Of special interest are the improvements in flexibility and the ease of integration. But despite the clear advantages of Web
Services, they are not yet in widespread use. In the majority of cases, the technology has been adopted only for small projects
or for feasibility studies. In order to tap the full potential of Web Services, they need to be applied to a wide range of interorganizational applications. As many studies unveil, the main reasons for the reluctance are security concerns (BEA, 2003;
Cap Gemini Ernest & Young, 2002). The results of another survey (META Group, 2003), recently conducted by a consulting
company, in which 262 enterprises were questioned about Web Services and their restraints or shortcomings, is shown in
Figure 1.
1

For a comprehensive description of WSDL, UDDI and SOAP see (Newcomer, 2002; Apte and Mehta, 2002; Snell et al.,
2002).
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What are restraints and shortcomings of Web Services?
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Figure 1. Restraints and shortcomings of Web Services (based on META Group, 2003)

Security concerns surrounding Web Services can be traced back to different facts. In the context of this paper, we identified
the following four important reasons:
1.

To some extent Web Services are used to deliberately bypass existing security mechanisms. SOAP messages are
“tunneled” over protocols such as HTTP or SMTP which are not filtered by firewalls. This opens up a security hole
and is directly in contradiction to what firewalls are meant for (Schneier, 2000).

2.

Implementing Web Services can only provide noticeable benefit to a company if they can be used to realize parts of
the business logic instead of simply receiving stock quotes or exchange rates. But by using them for important and
critical business functions, the lack of security may lead to fatal consequences both for the company providing the
services and for the legitimate users.

3.

Many applications include implementation flaws which can be exploited by an attacker. This danger especially
arises in large systems or software that has been enhanced over time to match a changed business environment. A
common field of application for Web Services is to use them for wrapping legacy systems, so that they can be called
via standardized interfaces and protocols (Beimborn, Mintert and Weitzel, 2002). Appraising the security of such
systems is complicated and even if existing weaknesses are known, it is difficult to subsequently secure these
applications.

4.

One goal of business software is to automate processes without involving human decision makers. This requires an
infrastructure capable of maintaining all critical secrets like private keys or other authentication tokens.

When deployed internally Web Services are not as strongly exposed to possible attacks as in inter-organizational settings.
This is one reason why the technology is currently used for enterprise application integration rather than for business-tobusiness integration. But risks still exist in the former case and the considerations of this paper, although focusing on an interorganizational use, also apply to Web Services employed within a single company.
Our research methodology is based on three pillars: literature review, evaluation of products and the development of a
prototype. Due to limited availability of research material on securing Web Services in inter-organizational applications the
development of the presented framework has been primarily inductive. Thus, we decided to evaluate the capabilities of
commercially obtainable products in addition to a literature review. We discuss discovered gaps and derive the herein
proposed concept.
The solution we present in this paper consists of an authorization engine that we develop at the Bavarian Research Network
for Information Systems (FORWIN). We start with an overview of existing security standards for Web Services and a
summary of products already available. Before discussing an example involving Web Services deployed in an interorganizational environment, we describe the concept of an authorization engine making its decisions based on the observation
of a whole business process. We then sketch a possible implementation of such a solution. Finally, we conclude with a
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach and an outlook on possible areas of future research.
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EXISTING SOLUTIONS

In this section we give an overview of existing efforts to protect Web Services. The first subsection contains a short summary
of relevant security standards2 and explains why, taken alone, they do not suffice. The second part describes the concept of
“XML application firewalls” and shows in turn their deficiency.
Security Standards for Web Services

Many efforts have already been made to standardize security mechanisms for Web Services. A lot of work has been done by
the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS, 2004) on one hand and by the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C, 2004) on the other hand. Table 1 summarizes the main specifications of OASIS and W3C
concerning the security of Web Services.
Abbreviation

Standard

From

Description

SAML

Security Assertion Markup Language

OASIS

Exchange of authentication and authorization data

WS-Security

OASIS

SOAP extension including XML security protocols

XACML

Extensible Access Control Markup Language

OASIS

Description of access control policies

XCBF

XML Common Biometric Format

OASIS

Exchange of biometrical data

XML Digital Signature

W3C

Integrity and non-repudiation of digital content

XML Encryption

W3C

Confidentiality of digital content

XKMS

XML Key Management Specification

W3C

Key management

XrML

Extensible Rights Management Language

OASIS

Digital rights management

Table 1. The main security standards for Web Services

These standards are necessary to assure the authenticity, the confidentiality, the integrity and the non-repudiation of SOAP
messages. However, their mere existence is not enough to guarantee an overall protection for Web Services. This is because
they only constitute single building blocks, which have to be appropriately employed in conjunction with other applicationspecific protocols. Besides, existing standards are often not sufficiently deployed and when implemented, serious errors
frequently occur. Predetermined security frameworks consisting of encryption and decryption functions and of methods for
the generation and verification of digital signatures help to avoid flaws, but unfortunately many application developers do not
make use of them. Moreover, logical errors in the Web Services themselves, such as those presented in the example of the
next section, can not be repaired by introducing new security standards. A possible way to protect potentially flawed and thus
vulnerable Web Services is to use a firewall which verifies incoming messages.
XML Application Firewalls

The concept of firewalls is widely known and frequently used to filter out inadmissible network traffic. Depending on the
ISO/OSI3 layer the firewall is acting at, we distinguish between “packet-filtering” (layer 3) and “circuit-filtering” (layer 4)
firewalls. The former filter data packets based on their source and destination address or the port number they are sent to.
Circuit-filtering firewalls on the other side observe entire TCP sessions. They prevent, among other attacks, so called
“session hijackings”, which allow an attacker to take over control of a connection initiated by another computer.
However, to secure Web Services it is not enough to block ports and to filter IP packets. Network traffic looking innocuous at
the lower ISO/OSI layers may constitute an attack at the application layer (Middendorf, 2003). Unsuspicious IP packets can
carry a SOAP message containing harmful code (Polster, 2003). As the security of the IT infrastructure (i.e. operating

2

(Polster, 2003) contains a short description of these standards. A more comprehensive presentation can be found in
(Hartmann, Flinn, Beznosov and Kawamoto, 2003).
3

ISO/OSI stands for the International Standards Organization/Open System Interconnection reference model. See e.g.
(Forouzan, 1998).
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systems, web servers etc.) is getting hardened, more and more attacks appear at the application level. An example for this is
the so called “SQL injection”. There are web servers which do not take the precaution of ensuring that requests they get from
a client are well formatted. Instead, they just take the received parameters and send them as part of an SQL query to the
database. By feeding such a server with fake parameters, an attacker may access protected data or change its content
(McDonald, 2004; Middendorf, 2003). Just as web applications can be fooled, Web Services too may be called with flawed
parameter values. As the parameters expected by a Web Service are precisely described in WSDL, an attacker could invoke it
using values that do not conform to the specified ones.
Many security solution providers have recognized the need for firewalls dedicated to the protection of Web Services. They
already offer solutions called “XML application firewalls”. Some examples are XML Filter from Microsoft®, Inc.
(Microsoft, 2002), XML Firewall from Westbridge Technology, Inc. (Westbridge, 2004), SOAP Content Inspector™ from
Quadrasis, Inc. (Quadrasis, 2004), as well as the products of Reactivity, Inc. (Reactivity, 2004), Vordel (Vordel, 2004), and
Check Point™ Software Technologies, Ltd. (Check Point, 2004). (Middendorf, 2003) contains a description of products from
some other providers. These solutions differ as to the risks they handle. The main capabilities of XML application firewalls
include:
•

Validation of SOAP messages to check that they match the specified XML Schemas (syntax verification)

•

Authentication and authorization of the caller

•

Digital signature to assure the integrity of SOAP messages

•

Encryption to assure the confidentiality of SOAP messages

•

Protection of the underlying transport layer through TLS/SSL and IP based authentication (SASL)4

•

Detection of dictionary attacks on passwords and denial of service attacks

The spread of XML application firewalls will increase when more organizations start to deploy Web Services. It is important
to note that application level firewalls must not be seen as a substitution for firewalls acting at the lower ISO/OSI layers. The
two kinds of firewalls, which some providers already integrate into a single product (Check Point, 2004), should rather be
used in a complementary manner to enlarge the spectrum of covered threats.
In a certain way, firewalls can be seen as a kind of authorization engines that have to decide whether a given action is
admissible or not. In order to make appropriate decisions it is helpful to consider the whole chain of actions, instead of just
looking at the current request. A deficiency of existing XML application firewalls is that they only examine single method
invocations. The relations between successive calls are not considered. Yet, many attacks consist of a combination of
requests, which differs from those appearing in regular use. SQL injection attacks succeed because systems are called with
parameters they were not intended to receive. Similarly, one could imagine attacks on Web Services in which several
methods are invoked in a combination and with parameters that the implementation was not designed to handle. This sort of
“semantic” attack is what the approach we propose is aiming to protect against.
NEW APPROACH

We present a solution which improves the security of Web Services by imposing additional obstacles on a possible attacker.
Firstly, we describe our approach which consists of an authorization engine making its decisions based on the observation of
an entire business process. In the third subsection we illustrate our idea using an example involving Web Services deployed
in an inter-organizational setting. Finally, we sketch a possible implementation.
Description

Usually, a Web Services provider offers a number of methods to be remotely invoked. They can be called in an arbitrary
combination and with any parameters. But only a very small fraction of these possibilities is sensible from the application’s
point of view. When buying an item for example, one first asks for its price and pays after that, not the other way around. The
meaningful combinations can be modeled as business processes. Now, the idea is to execute Web Services only in the context
of an instance of a business process. If an activity is not currently planned according to the business process, it will not be
carried out. This way random access to potentially vulnerable Web Services can be avoided. The approach is meant to
improve security by limiting access to Web Services in the same way that “design by contract” (Meyer, 1992) is meant to
improve the reliability of software by imposing preconditions on method invocations to prevent erroneous calls.

4

For a description of TLS/SSL and SASL see (Rescorla, 2000; Joseffson, 2004).
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Figure 2 shows where an authorization engine enforcing this restriction would be situated in the overall architecture. It is
important to note that it constitutes an additional security measure and is not meant as a replacement of other mechanisms.

Authorization Engine

WS Consumer

Internet

Network Firewall

Application

Web Service
Web Service
Web Service
WS Provider

Figure 2. The authorization engine's position in the overall architecture

The approach resembles somehow that of intrusion detection systems (IDS), which monitor IT systems in order to detect
anomalies indicating an attack. The difference consists in the way authorization decisions are made. Because it is impossible
to model all admissible scenarios explicitly when protecting computer networks or operating systems, other methods are used
to determine unauthorized activities. These can be divided into two categories. On one hand, there are IDS based on
stochastic models of a system’s normal behavior. Such models are created by observing the (legitimate) interactions taking
place during a certain period. If significant deviations to the modeled behavior occur, an alarm is triggered. On the other
hand, methods exist which are able to detect predefined attack patterns. They permanently monitor the IT system and send
out a warning as soon as one of the patterns appears. Considering Web Services, it is not possible to model attack patterns,
because it is unknown which weaknesses in the services can be combined to form a threat. But in general, it is possible to
precisely define the business processes the Web Services are intended to participate in.
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Example

Throughout this section we will explain our concept of an authorization engine to secure Web Services based on a fictitious
example. Let’s consider a company providing IT services for travel agencies and the necessary steps to arrange and book a
journey. There are seven different Web Services available to cover the business logic of this task: Get Airfare Quotes, Get
Hotel Quotes, Choose Flight, Choose Hotel, Book Trip, Payment Received and Send Tickets. By using the first two services,
the travel agencies are able to inform their clients about available flights and hotel rooms. Choose Flight and Choose Hotel,
are then used to select the desired itinerary and accommodations, respectively. By executing the 5th Web Service the system
books the chosen flights and hotels. The method Payment Received notifies the server about the incoming payment and the
last service is finally used to trigger a mailing of the documents to the customer.

Figure 3. Business process “journey booking”

By using an XML application firewall one can assure the integrity of exchanged messages, the confidentiality of data about
customers, the authentication and authorization of the connected travel agencies as well as the bindingness of a booked trip.
Nevertheless, an authorization engine can help in further increasing security as shown in the following. Consider the business
process depicted in Figure 3. In order to protect the system against “semantic” attacks, which may include method calls with
malicious parameters or the invocation of several Web Services in an improper combination, the following rules could be
specified:
1.

The parameter for the Web Service Choose Flight must match one of the results from the previous call to Get
Airfare Quotes. The same is true for Get Hotel Quotes and Choose Hotel. Applying this rule prevents a potential
attacker from exploiting possible implementation flaws in the Choose Flight and Choose Hotel Web Services, which
may otherwise lead to unforeseen effects, for example, if dates are used during which the hotel or the flight is not
available or sold out.

2.

Before calling Book Trip, the system needs to check that the dates for the flight and the hotel correlate. This rule can
avert the following attack: Assume that the applicable rates are determined on the basis of the selected flight.
Further, consider the case where the Web Service used to cancel already booked trips is inconsistently implemented
such that the season and therefore the amount of the back payment is based on the chosen hotel. In such a situation
and without the described examination of the method invocations, an attacker would be able to book a trip by
selecting a flight in the post season and a hotel in the peak season. If s/he is canceling the tour afterwards and if the
difference in prices is high enough, the attacker would make a profit, although cancellation fees may be charged.

3.

Only after the Payment Received service was executed successfully, the system may allow a call to Send Tickets.
This prevents fraudulent use which is possible if the authorization check of the last Web Service is vulnerable.
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Possible Implementation

The attacks we are protecting against concern malicious invocations of Web Services. Given a call to a method an
authorization engine has to decide, based on the history of the current instance of the business process and on the parameters
of that call, whether it should be executed or not. In this section we give a brief overview of a possible implementation for the
proposed solution. After describing the main components of the system we show how a modeling formalism such as
BPEL4WS can help to realize it.
System Components

First of all, we must distinguish between design-time and run-time issues. The components of the system can be categorized
into two classes as follows:
1.

Components concerning both design-time and run-time:
a.

Service (In, Out):
Services are the objects to protect. Each service has got two parameters. The parameter “In” represents all
the input data transmitted to the service when invoked. “Out” stands for the result data returned by the
service after completion. A service potentially contains (implementation) flaws.

b.

Role:
By “role” we mean a role in the sense of access control systems (Ferraiolo, Kuhn and Chandramouli, 2003).
That is, only subjects belonging to a certain role are authorized to invoke a given service. We will not
further consider the act of associating subjects with roles. Assertions concerning this association are
received as SAML documents from the authentication process. The methods used for the authentication
might be faulty, too.

c.

Business Process (Constraints):
Hereby we mean a business process (BP) modeled from the application’s point of view, not from a
technical one. The atomic tasks which make up a BP are the services. A BP determines the temporal and
logical order as well as the combination in which the services have to be executed. Together with the BP,
security constraints may be specified, which determine conditions for granting access rights to the services.
The simplest (degenerate) BP would consist of a single service. A constraint could indicate the roles
allowed to invoke this service.

2.

Components concerning run-time only:
a.

Business Process Instance:
At runtime there may be one or more incarnations of a BP. One such incarnation is called a “business
process instance” (BPI). Comparing this to an object oriented programming language, BPs would
correspond to classes and BPIs to objects.

b.

Business Process Instance ID:
Each BPI is uniquely identified by a so called “business process instance ID” (BPI-ID). Every time a caller
invokes a service s/he uses such a BPI-ID to specify the BPI s/he is referring to. That is, services can only
be executed within the context of a running BPI.

c.

Invocation (inVal, outVal, contextVal):
When a service is invoked with the parameter value “inVal” and returns “outVal” as the result, we speak of
an “invocation (inVal, outVal, contextVal)”, where “contextVal” sums up all relevant context information
of the service call. contextVal consists of the calling time, the role of the caller, the BPI-ID of the business
process instance the call belongs to, etc.

d.

History:
The history is a repository for all the invocations executed so far along the belonging inVal, outVal and
contextVal.

e.

Security Rules:
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Security rules are (automatically) generated from the modeled BP and the corresponding constraints. They
determine in which context a given invocation is admissible.
f.

Entities:
Every variable (role, input and output parameters, BPI-ID, time, etc.) used to decide whether a call to a
service should be executed or not is called an “entity”. Entities are the variables the security rules refer to.

g.

Evidence:
At run-time the entities are assigned concrete values. The sum of this information we call “evidence”.

h.

Authorization Engine:
The “authorization engine” decides whether a given call to a service is admissible or not. To do so, the
currently available evidence (which comes from inVal, contextVal and the history) is assigned to the
appropriate entities. Then the generated security rules are evaluated in order to make a decision.

BPEL4WS

BPEL4WS is a programming abstraction that allows developers to compose multiple synchronous and asynchronous Web
Services into an end-to-end business flow. It provides for the modeling of business processes made up of service invocations.
BPEL4WS is an extensible language permitting the introduction of new elements to satisfy special needs. We think that it can
be used even without such an extension to help implement the above presented system. All the described components can be
expressed using constructs contained in BPEL4WS.
The history (i.e. the current state of the BPI) can be traced using „variables”. In BPEL4WS variables are state variables
permitting the maintenance of the state of a business process. Variables associated with message types can be specified as
input or output variables. This is how to store the InVal and OutVal parameter sets mentioned above. By assigning concrete
values to the variables during execution (using BPEL4WS’ assign activity) evidence is gathered. More evidence lies
implicitly in the path taken by the business process instance. Recall that a BP may contain different paths from which the BPI
may choose one according to preset conditions at run-time.
Correlations are suitable for implementing the concept of BPI-IDs. In BPEL4WS “(global) correlation sets” are used as
aliases for the identities of business process instances. Using them the protocol can figure out which BPI a given message
belongs to. The In and Out parameters can be represented by “message properties”. In WSDL each operation of a port type
has got input and/or output messages.
The constraints leading (together with the structure of the BP) to rules could be modeled through “join conditions”. In
BPEL4WS each activity has a join condition. If this Boolean expression evaluates to true, the corresponding activity is
executed else it is not. Due to the use of XPath 1.0 to specify join conditions in the current version of BPEL4WS the
expressiveness of constraints would however be restricted, as, for example, it is only possible to do calculations with integers
(i.e. divisions are not permitted) and strings can only be checked for equality but not arbitrarily manipulated. But in the
future, richer languages like XQuery (Brundage, 2004) are expected to be used in conjunction with BPEL4WS enabling the
formulation of more complex constraints. In practice, the modeling of a BP can be supported by appropriate tools, which
could make suggestions about the constraints and group them hierarchically to facilitate their administration.
It is important to note that using BPEL4WS is just one option. The components we defined abstractly in the last subsection
could also be implemented using other languages. For example if a business process management engine is already in place
its formalism should be used in order to avoid modeling the same workflows twice.
CONCLUSION

The standards surrounding Web Services still have to be seen a work in progress, and some aspects need further
developments. Nevertheless, we clearly see advantages of using Web Services in the area of flexible integration and therefore
the necessity of securing them.
This paper presents an authorization engine that implicitly restricts potential attackers rather than explicitly forbidding them
to execute certain operations. The proposed solution will not always thwart a misuse of the services. A denial of service
attack for instance has to be prevented by other means. However, especially the danger of a “semantic” attack is reduced,
which improves the overall security.
The main drawback of our approach is the additional overhead it causes. The study we mentioned at the beginning (META
Group, 2003) states that enterprises are concerned about the costs of securing Web Services. The costs introduced by our
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approach are mainly due to the necessity of modeling the business processes. Each of their facets, such as the relationships
between exchanged massages, has to be specified in detail. This disadvantage is however relativized by the fact that a neat
modeling of the business processes is useful, independent of security considerations. It helps optimizing the processes and
improving their quality.
As with most research fields there are many areas for improvement and future study. So far we concentrated on securing a set
of Web Services hosted by a single server on which the authorization engine runs. It would be interesting to examine how to
extend this solution to the case of multiple Web Services providers. A future goal could also be the development of a tool
which can be used as a plug-in in integrated development environments like Microsoft’s Visual Studio® (Microsoft, 2004) or
the Eclipse project (Eclipse, 2004). Such a tool could support the modeling of business processes and the specification of
security constraints and could use the results to automatically generate the rules applied by the authorization engine.
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